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Epistemic Dilemma and Epistemic Conflict 
 
Introduction 
When philosophers think about epistemic dilemmas, they usually think about certain 
evidential situations in which epistemic principles appear to give incompatible 
recommendations, render all available options impermissible, or lead to irrational outcomes in 
some other way. The main question about epistemic dilemmas is whether there can be 
evidential circumstances that make it inevitable for agents to violate at least one epistemic 
principle in their doxastic response to a proposition. Discussions about epistemic dilemmas, 
thus, primarily target the possibility that epistemic principles fail to do what they are supposed 
to do: justify or recommend at least one doxastic response relative to a specific body of 
evidence. In the debate on epistemic dilemmas, case descriptions are central. Advocates for 
the possibility of epistemic dilemmas aim to identify uncontroversial cases in which it is 
inevitable for agents to adopt irrational attitudes; opponents of the possibility of epistemic 
dilemmas aim to show that the above-presented cases can be resolved and thus do not pose 
genuine dilemmas. 
In this paper, I will examine the notion of an epistemic dilemma, its characterizations 
in the literature, and the different intuitions prompted by it. I will illustrate that the notion of 
an epistemic dilemma is expected to capture various phenomena that are not easily unified 
with one concept: while some aspects of these phenomena are more about the agent in a 
certain situation, other aspects seem to be more about the situation as such. As a consequence, 
incompatible intuitions emerge concerning the transparency of epistemic dilemmas as well as 
regarding the role that the so-called third doxastic stance plays in resolving cases of epistemic 
dilemma.  
I suggest we will be in a better position to answer the questions about transparency 
and the role of a neutral stance if we distinguish between the mental state of agents who find 
themselves in an epistemic dilemma and the normative situation that gives rise to a dilemma. I 
will refer to the agent’s mental state as epistemic conflict and will reserve the term epistemic 
dilemma for evidential situations in which epistemic principles either recommend 
incompatible doxastic responses or render all options impermissible. The concept of epistemic 
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conflict not only captures the mental state of agents who find themselves in a genuine 
epistemic dilemma but also applies to agents who face difficult epistemic choices that they 
cannot resolve without substantial cognitive (and often pragmatic) effort. I will spell out the 
relation of epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict with the help of ideal agent S and 
nonideal agent S. It will be illuminating to uncover the factors that allow epistemic conflict 
and epistemic dilemma to come apart for these two agents. 
In Section 1, I will capture the notion of an epistemic dilemma as it is used in the 
literature and identify two relevant aspects. In Section 2, I will formulate a realistic case that 
gives rise to a genuine epistemic dilemma. I will use this case in Section 3 to show that there 
are diverging intuitions concerning the transparency of epistemic dilemmas and the role of 
suspension. In the fourth section, I will explicate the concepts of epistemic dilemmas and 




1 Being Caught in a Dilemma 
To better understand epistemic dilemmas, it is helpful to look at moral dilemmas first. One of 
the most famous cases that is supposed to constitute a moral dilemma is Sophie’s Choice, and, 
although it is not optimal,1 I will use it here because it is so well known: Sophie, the mother 
of two children, is forced to decide which of her two children is going to live, and which is 
going to die. As their mother, Sophie obviously has a moral obligation with respect to each of 
her two children to protect them. Yet, no matter which one of the two she chooses to protect, 
she will inevitably fail to meet her moral obligation with respect to the other child. This 
situation is said to be a moral dilemma because all of Sophie’s options are such that she will 
ultimately fail to meet her moral obligations. Sophie is trapped in this situation, and there is 
no way out of it. 
 Rational dilemmas appear to be structurally similar to moral dilemmas: in both 
situations, agents are unable to answer certain matters in accordance with the relevant norms 
because all options are in some sense impermissible. An epistemic dilemma arises with regard 
to the truth of a proposition in a particular evidential context. In an epistemic dilemma, agents 
cannot but violate at least one epistemic principle when making up their mind regarding p’s 
truth, given the evidence. Typically, epistemic dilemmas are said to arise due to the 
recommendations of at least two epistemic principles that either jointly render all options 
 
1 What makes it not optimal is the fact that there is a third-party involved. It seems possible, though, to translate 
Sophie’s Choice into a setting involving only natural forces. 
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impermissible or pull in opposite directions given a particular evidential context.2 Here are 
some characterizations of epistemic dilemmas in the literature: 
 
Let us agree that it is a sufficient condition for a person, S, to be in an epistemic dilemma 
with regard to a proposition, P, if S’s epistemic reasons argue that S should not believe P, 
should not deny P, and should not withhold judgment on P. (Conee 1994: 475) 
 
In an epistemic impasse, you shouldn’t adopt any doxastic attitude toward P, even though 
you’re condemned to adopt one of them. (Turri 2012: 359) 
 
There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at all, one will have a 
rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes – or if one doesn’t, one will end up 
being cognitively imperfect in some other manner. (Brouwer 2014: 4451) 
 
This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a 
doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. (Leonard 2020: 573) 
 
According to these characterizations of epistemic dilemmas, there are two aspects that play a 
decisive role: (i) the agent somehow is required to respond doxastically, but (ii) is unable to 
do so because the epistemic principles fail to provide rational instructions on how to respond 
in the current evidential context. There are at least two questions to ask here: First, what kind 
of failure on the part of the epistemic principles is there and how does this failure lead to the 
agent’s inability to respond rationally? Second, it is essential to ask where the requirement to 
respond doxastically is coming from and why it is not an option for the agent to simply not 
respond doxastically. I will address these questions in the next two subsections.  
 
1.1 Failure and Inability  
What kind of failure is there on the part of epistemic rationality such that agents are incapable 
of responding in a rational way? It seems that the problem for agents who are in an epistemic 
dilemma is not that the epistemic principles are merely silent on what to do. The problem, 
rather, is that, in a manner of speaking, they are talking too much. The agents’ inability to 
 
2 Turri (2012) distinguished between “epistemic impasse” and “epistemic dilemma”: an impasse is a situation in 
which an agent has to choose between options, all of which are impermissible, whereas a dilemma is a situation 
in which an agent is obliged to adopt incompatible options. I will treat epistemic impasse as a special case of 
epistemic dilemma. 
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rationally make up their minds about the truth of the proposition in question is not a result of 
the absence of recommendations provided by the epistemic principles; rather, it seems to be 
the presence of such recommendations that incapacitate the agents’ ability to make rational 
epistemic choices.  
Depending on whether epistemic principles are spelt out as obligations or permissions, 
the failure of epistemic rationality as it is supposed to occur in epistemic dilemmas can be 
stated in two different ways: First, epistemic rationality may fail if two or more epistemic 
principles are in conflict such that it is not clear (neither in the particular case nor in general) 
which principle takes precedence over the other(s). Taken together, the principles obligate 
agents to pursue rationally incompatible courses of action at the same time. Following this 
obligation would lead to “a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes” (Brouwer 
2014: 4451), whereas ignoring one’s epistemic obligations would obviously be irrational as 
well. In such situations, the agent ends up being doxastically irrational, no matter what, and is 
thus unable to respond in a rational way.  
Second, the failure of epistemic rationality can be described as each principle 
prohibiting at least one course of action such that, taken together, all available options are 
rendered impermissible by the obtaining principles (Conee 1994; Turri 2012). Whichever 
doxastic attitude the agent chooses, it will be rationally impermissible. At first glance, the 
impermissibility of all doxastic options seems less problematic than the obligation to do 
incompatible things because an agent’s omission to adopt a doxastic attitude seems to be a 
permissible option after all. However, we need to distinguish between ‘course of action’ and 
‘adopting a doxastic attitude’. A genuinely dilemmic situation in terms of impermissibility 
concerns all courses of action, not just those that consist in the formation of a doxastic 
attitude. Thus, to show that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas, case descriptions that rely 
on impermissibility have to make sure that an agent’s omission to adopt any doxastic attitude 
counts as an impermissible doxastic reaction as well.3 Only then it would be intelligible to say 
that the epistemic principles fail to provide rational instructions by rendering every possible 
option impermissible and that agents are thereby incapacitated to respond rationally. It is 
important to see that an omission to form any doxastic attitude regarding a proposition is a 
doxastic response in the sense that an agent cognitively relates to that proposition and does 
 
3 It seems that Conee (1994), in the quote above, takes “withholding judgment” to be exactly this: neither 
adopting the attitude of belief nor that of disbelief regarding a certain proposition. But if we take withholding or 
suspending to be a doxastic attitude itself, and not just the joint absence of doxastic attitudes (as has been 
recently proposed by Rosenkranz (2007), Friedman (2013a, 2017) and others), then proponents of epistemic 
dilemmas need to make sure that the rational principles applying in dilemmic cases do not permit adopting none 
of the three doxastic attitudes (believing, disbelieving and suspending). 
Verena Wagner, University of Konstanz  June 1, 2021 
 5 
not form an attitude on the basis of her evidence. The mere absence of any attitude regarding 
p, however, is not necessarily a doxastic response because the mere absence of doxastic 
attitudes regarding some proposition may be the result of the subject’s never having 
considered the truth of this proposition.4 Finding a case-description like this is not an easy 
task for the proponent of epistemic dilemmas. In the next section, I focus on this aspect of 
epistemic dilemmas: why is not forming an attitude not an option in these cases? Why is the 
agent required to consider the evidence regarding p in the first place? Why not just opt out? 
 
1.2 Requirement to Respond Doxastically 
If we grant that epistemic dilemmas occur in evidential contexts in which all possible doxastic 
options are rendered irrational by the epistemic principles or in which the epistemic principles 
recommend incompatible courses of action, then it is sensible to say that agents in epistemic 
dilemmas are incapable to respond rationally. Whatever they do, they will do something 
irrational. However, it not yet clear what component of an epistemic dilemma makes sure that 
the agent is required to respond doxastically in the first place. This requirement to respond is 
needed to guarantee that the agent is trapped or caught in a dilemma. This idea that there is no 
way out is expressed by stating that an agent in an epistemic dilemma is “condemned to 
adopt” (Turri 2012: 359) an impermissible doxastic attitude, is “doomed to have an 
impermissible attitude” (Leonard 2020: 577), is “doomed to fall short of some rational ideal” 
(Christensen, 2010: 212), or that the agent’s “cognitive shortfall is unavoidable” (Brouwer 
2014: 4451). But where is this pressure to respond to a given proposition or question coming 
from? What feature of a case description that is supposed to be an epistemic dilemma plays 
the crucial role to condemn the agent to adopt an attitude or to make a doxastic choice in the 
first place?5 
When we look at moral cases like Sophie’s Choice, it is easy to see why Sophie is 
condemned to make a choice between her two children. Sophie faces the threat that both of 
her children are going to die if she refuses to choose one of them over the other. Thus, she is 
strongly motivated to make that choice to prevent the loss of both of her children. Without 
this threat, Sophie could easily avoid being caught in such a moral dilemma by just refusing 
to think it through. It seems that, to be caught in any kind of dilemma that arises in the context 
of settling a question, whether it is moral or epistemic, there needs to be a strong motivation 
 
4 See Bergmann (2004), p. 421: “I shall call these three attitudes, i.e., believing, disbelieving and withholding, as 
I have described it here, ‘the doxastic attitudes’. Together with the possibility of taking no doxastic attitude at 
all, this gives four ways of relating to a proposition”. 
5 Note that there is a distinction between being required to make a choice among different attitudes and being 
required to adopt a particular attitude. I am concerned with the former. 
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to answer this question; it is this motivation that ensures that the agent is bound to answer the 
question and does not opt out prematurely. Only if the agent is bound to make a choice about 
how to respond will the fact that all options are prohibited lead to the situation that the agent 
is actually doomed to respond irrationally. 
As we can see, the lack of epistemic guidance alone does not yet bring it about that an 
agent is caught in an epistemic dilemma. Why would anyone struggle with being unable to 
answer a certain question if there is no need to answer the question in the first place? 
Therefore, any case that describes an agent as being trapped in an epistemic dilemma has to 
say something about the agent’s motivation to answer this particular question.6 The kind of 
motivation that is relevant here can but does not have to be purely intellectual. As long as 
there is no state-directed motivation to adopt a certain doxastic attitude regarding a 
proposition p (e.g., believing that p), there is no problem with being pragmatically motivated 
to find the answer to the question whether p.7 
 
2 A Sample Case 
Let me introduce an example case of an epistemic dilemma that satisfies the following 
conditions: It is a realistic case that does not include magical features, over-idealized 
cognitive abilities, and self-destructive or self-undermining evidence. Furthermore, in this 
case, the agent is required to respond doxastically with respect to the question whether a 
certain proposition p is true, and the evidential context is such that either any doxastic 
response regarding p is rationally prohibited, or the agent is rationally obligated to have 
incompatible doxastic attitudes. 
 
REV-TEST Sarah is a student and took an online test with 10 yes/no questions. She is 
under pressure to achieve a score of 100% and took the test very seriously. When 
submitting her answers, she is confident that she answered all the questions correctly. 
The system reports that all but one question was answered correctly but does not say 
which of her answers is incorrect. Surprisingly, Sarah is given a one-time opportunity 
to reconsider her original answers. She is advised to either resubmit her set of answers 
as it was, or to revise it within a short period of time, during which she will not have 
access to any further information. After having thoroughly reviewed each of her 
 
6 Indeed, most case descriptions are such that the pressure of time, at least implicitly, plays some role: exams, 
footraces, logic tests and so on have to be taken or finished at a certain point of time (Christensen 2010; Foley 
1991; Odegard 1993); pilots need to get down before they run out of fuel (Christensen 2010; Lasonen-Aarnio 
2014); and donations, tips, and bets have to be made (Christensen 2010; Odegard 1993; Priest 2002). 
7 See Jonathan Kvanvig (2003: 41) who argued that “[w]e do have an interest in the truth, both pragmatic and 
purely intellectual.”  
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original answers A1 to A10, Sarah is unable to identify the incorrect answer based on 
her current evidence.8 
 
Let us suppose that Sarah looks at each of her answers and asks herself: should I revise this 
answer? Rationally, Sarah is not permitted to pick an arbitrary answer and disbelieve its 
correctness because the original evidence that led her to this particular answer in the first 
round is still undefeated; she further has statistical evidence that this answer is correct (she 
knows that she has answered 9 out of 10 questions correctly); and she has almost no evidence 
that it is false (only 1 answer out of 10 is false). This clearly speaks in favor of believing that 
this particular answer is correct. Yet, the just-described evidential situation for this particular 
answer is the same for all 10 answers. If, on this evidential basis, she sticks to believing that 
this particular answer is correct, then she is rationally obligated to do the same for every other 
answer as well. However, she is rationally not permitted to believe that all of her answers are 
correct because she knows from the report that one of them is false. The crucial point is that 
she also cannot opt out and do nothing because she already adopted beliefs about each 
answer’s correctness in the first round, and now, given the report in the second round, she 
additionally disbelieves that all answers are correct. In the face of the report, it would 
epistemically irrational not to revise her beliefs of the first round and just keep them. (As I 
will point out later, on the practical side, walking away and not doing anything is not an 
option, because then she would not pass the test at all. 
If she disbelieves the conjunction that all of her answers are correct, as she is obligated 
to do given the report, she has to disbelieve one answer’s correctness. However, given the 
current evidence, and there is no prospect of gaining any further evidence, there is no way to 
determine which answer that should be. It would also be irrational for Sarah to pick an 
arbitrary answer and disbelieve its correctness or suspend about it because there is no 
evidence that suggests picking this particular answer instead of any other, not to mention the 
evidence there is to believe of each single answer that it is correct. That means that either 
Sarah has to form an attitude against her evidence or, if she does not and sticks to her original 
answers, she has to violate simple closure principles. Sarah is indeed trapped in a situation in 
which, given her evidence, any doxastic response regarding the correctness of her individual 
 
8 REV-TEST is inspired by the Preface Paradox and by my students complaining that they could not see which 
of the questions they answered incorrectly in an online test they were allowed to repeat as often as they wanted 
within a certain time. Littlejohn (forthcoming) offers a similar example, in which agents deliberate about their 
performance in an eye exam. The main difference between his example and mine is that my example has an 
actual second round that requires the agent to make up her mind and revise on the basis of previous evidence and 
additional evidence provided by the report. Sarah cannot walk away from her task because she is pragmatically 
motivated to uncover and correct her mistake. 
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answers leads to an epistemically irrational outcome. REV-TEST satisfies the condition that, 
no matter what Sarah is doing (or omitting to do), it will be epistemically irrational. 
But why is she caught in that situation? Why not just leave the situation and not 
respond doxastically at all? If it were not for Sarah’s strong motivation to revise her set of 
answers, she would not remain in this situation for long. Her motivation to score 100% 
explains why she remains in this hopeless situation and does not simply opt out. Sarah’s 
motivation may be grounded in strong ambition, pure intellectual curiosity, or practical 
reasons like meeting her parents’ expectations or not losing her stipend. Whether the 
motivation is pragmatic or epistemic does not play a role here, as long as the motivation is 
object-directed (getting it right) and not state-directed (adopting a certain attitude irrespective 
of its adequacy (e.g., as in Foley’s (1991) example)).9 Because of her motivation, Sarah is 
trapped in a situation she cannot resolve. 
Sure enough, Sarah’s evidential context gives rise to a practical problem as well: 
because she needs to excel in this test, she cannot just resubmit her answers, knowing that one 
of them is false. She cannot arbitrarily revise one answer because she does not know which 
answer is incorrect, and the chance that she will pick an actually correct answer for revision, 
and thereby lower her score, is just too high, whereas the chance that she will pick the one 
incorrect answer for revision, and thereby score 100, is rather low. She also cannot walk away 
from this task and refuse to resubmit because that would mean that she would not pass the test 
at all. Whatever she does, she will fall short of her own ideals. 
Note that even if Sarah encounters a practical problem, her situation does not qualify 
as a dilemma of practical rationality. Speaking in terms of maximizing utility, for example, it 
is clearly rational for Sarah to resubmit the set of answers as it was because the chance of 
worsening her original score is 9/10, whereas the chance of being lucky and improving her 
score is only 1/10. In this situation, it would be irrational for Sarah to take the risk and 
arbitrarily change one of her answers. Sarah is in an epistemic dilemma, though: she is under 
epistemic pressure to revise her current doxastic state, but none of the possible revisions are 
epistemically permitted. She cannot omit revising and do nothing because it would be 
incoherent to remain in disbelief that all ten answers are correct and, at the same time, believe 
each particular answer A1 to A10 to be correct. Whatever Sarah will be doing to revise her 
doxastic state, it will be impermissible given her evidence.  
 
9 Foley (1991) offered a situation in which agents are strongly motivated not to adopt a certain belief that they 
have adequate evidence for because adopting the belief would destroy that evidence. This is not the case here. 
Sarah is motivated to find the truth because she needs to know and has no interest in adopting a particular 
attitude. 
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Although Sarah is in an epistemic dilemma but not in a practical one, one feature of 
the case description keeps her struggling practically and epistemically: she is strongly 
motivated to score 100 and it is psychologically not easy to let go of that aim. This motivation 
that keeps her from resubmitting the set of answers as it was, I argue, is the very same feature 
that keeps her trapped in the epistemic dilemma: she upholds the aim of finding out which 
answer is incorrect even though she cannot succeed. 
 
3  Intuitions and Problems  
3.1  Transparency 
Being trapped in a (rational) dilemma, so it seems, essentially requires a conflict between 
one’s aim to answer the issue (rationally) and one’s inability to achieve this aim. This, I 
suggest, is the crucial intuition behind the idea that agents in an epistemic dilemma are 
necessarily aware of the problem that the epistemic principles prohibit every possible 
doxastic response in the respective evidential context. In my example case REV-TEST, Sarah 
is well aware of her situation and struggles to do the right thing doxastically. She is strongly 
motivated to find out for each individual answer whether it is correct or not, but she is unable 
to achieve this aim given her fixed evidential context. What keeps her trapped in this situation 
is her motivation to answer the question in combination with her knowledge that any doxastic 
response would be irrational in this evidential context. How else could agents be caught in a 
situation and struggle with their inability to answer a question if they do not know there is a 
problem? 
Having said that, it seems false to say that one and the same evidential context gives 
rise to a dilemma for one agent but not for another agent, depending on whether or not they 
are aware of the rational obligations that apply in this situation. Is it not true for both agents 
that they cannot but respond irrationally in this context? Why would an agent’s awareness of 
the relevant principles of rationality change this fact? If there is no rational way to respond, 
then not knowing about the problem will not evoke a rational response. Thus, it seems that we 
can pin down the relevant factors for a situation that give rise to an epistemic dilemma 
without requiring that an agent who is in that situation be aware of all of these factors. If it is 
true that some evidential contexts are such that the epistemic principles fail to recommend a 
rational doxastic response, this seems to be an objective fact. If we agree that REV-TEST is a 
case of genuine epistemic dilemma, then this status should not be contested, even if Sarah 
would be prepared to resubmit the original answers without any struggle; and it should not be 
contested, even if Sarah would revise her original position and end up disbelieving answer A3 
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just because three is her unlucky number. It seems sensible to say that Sarah would still be in 
a situational epistemic dilemma even if she does not struggle due to her misapprehension of 
what is rational given the evidence. 
As I have shown, there are two essential aspects of the notion of epistemic dilemma 
that pull in opposing directions. How can an approach to epistemic dilemmas do justice to the 
natural connotation of dilemma as experienced struggle, on the one hand, and also address the 
need for an objective description of the evidential setting, on the other hand? In Section 4, I 
suggest distinguishing between epistemic conflict and epistemic dilemma to achieve this goal. 
Before doing so, I will discuss the intuition that taking a neutral stance can be helpful for 
resolving alleged cases of epistemic dilemmas. 
 
3.2  The Third Doxastic Stance 
For many situations of conflicting evidence, the so-called third doxastic stance has proven 
helpful. If agents lack sufficient evidence for believing a proposition p and also lack sufficient 
evidence for disbelieving p, then they should take a neutral stance regarding p. Similarly, if 
there is equally balanced evidence for believing and for disbelieving p, then agents should 
remain doxastically neutral on the issue. Remaining neutral can be spelt out in different 
ways—for example, in terms of holding back a final verdict on the matter, in terms of 
bracketing one’s beliefs in the presence of undercutting defeaters and opposed higher-order 
evidence, or in terms of adopting a neutral attitude with regard to the proposition in question. 
The debate on doxastic neutrality in terms of an attitude has gained traction in recent years, 
prominently by contributions by Sven Rosenkranz (2007) and Jane Friedman (2013, 2017).  
It is tempting to think that a neutral stance could provide a way to resolve cases of 
alleged epistemic dilemma. Indeed, the third doxastic option besides believing and 
disbelieving is what makes the doxastic realm so special. Surely this must provide some help 
in dealing with alleged cases of epistemic dilemma. The suggestion that a neutral stance may 
neutralize dilemmas can be advanced in at least two ways: First, one could argue, among all 
the irrational options agents have at their disposal in cases of alleged epistemic dilemmas, a 
neutral stance, even if not perfect, is still the best one can do rationally (Conee 1994). 
Alternatively, one could argue that some form of neutrality is universally permitted and 
qualifies as a general fallback option. 
Let us then consider whether a neutral stance would be helpful for Sarah. As I pointed 
out in Section 2, because the evidence is identical for each individual answer, Sarah cannot 
rationally adopt diverging doxastic attitudes with regard to answers A1–A10. Thus, if she 
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believes one answer to be correct given the statistical evidence, then she has to believe of 
every other answer that it is correct as well. However, given her knowledge that one of the 10 
answers is indeed incorrect, she cannot believe that all answers are correct and hence has to 
violate closure. Thus, what would be the best strategy to revise in a way that is compatible 
with her knowledge that one answer is incorrect? Picking one answer and believing it 
incorrect at will against the evidence seems not only psychologically unlikely but clearly 
irrational. Picking one answer and suspending with regard to its correctness is not an 
improvement at all. In both cases, Sarah would be required to neglect the evidence that speaks 
for the answer’s correctness. Moreover, if only one answer is picked to be suspended upon, 
this would lead to different attitudes regarding her answers, despite having identical statistical 
evidence for all of them. Suspending with regard to the conjunction is clearly irrational as 
well because Sarah knows that exactly one answer is incorrect and therefore has to disbelieve 
the conjunction.  
But what about suspending in every individual case? If Sarah suspends with respect to 
each individual answer’s correctness, this is at least compatible with disbelieving the 
conjunction. Furthermore, with this consistent response, Sarah would not be guilty of having 
different attitudes regarding individual answers, despite having identical statistical evidence 
for each one of them. Hence, suspending with respect to the truth of each single answer while 
disbelieving their conjunction seems to be in some sense “the best” response to the evidence 
at hand. Unfortunately, however, there is still the local problem that suspending regarding the 
correctness of each single answer requires a disregard of the evidence that speaks clearly for 
believing it to be correct. 
It may well be that, for this case, it is true that suspending with regard to each 
individual answer’s correctness is in some sense better than all the alternatives, but that alone 
does not make it epistemically rational. Maybe there is another way of accounting for the 
intuition that suspending is in some sense better without claiming that the epistemic dilemma 
(if there is one) is actually resolved. In the next section, I will explain what this might look 
like. 
 
4 Distinguishing Epistemic Conflict and Dilemma 
In order to accommodate the intuitions regarding transparency and the role of a neutral stance, 
I suggest drawing a distinction between the normative situation that none of the possible 
doxastic responses is justified in a particular evidential context, on the one hand, and the 
mental state of an agent who is trapped in this normative situation, on the other. The 
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characterizations of epistemic dilemmas as displayed in the quotations in Section 2 blend 
these two aspects into one notion of an epistemic dilemma. The aim of doing justice to both 
aspects is natural because case descriptions of epistemic dilemmas typically address the 
normative situation as well as the agent’s mental state in that situation without explicitly 
saying so. My aim in the following is to separate the two aspects conceptually and to show 
under what conditions they may come together or apart in certain cases. 
I will refer to the mental state of an agent who is trapped in an epistemic dilemma as 
epistemic conflict and to the normative situation as epistemic dilemma.  
 
 
4.1  Epistemic Dilemmas 
I define epistemic dilemmas as follows: 
 
(ED) Epistemic Dilemma 
An epistemic dilemma is a situation in a given evidential context in which epistemic 
principles either recommend the adoption of rationally incompatible doxastic attitudes 
regarding a certain proposition p or prohibit all available doxastic options regarding p. 
 
According to ED, my REV-TEST example describes a situation that qualifies as an epistemic 
dilemma, but that being so has nothing to do with Sarah in particular, the protagonist in this 
case. It is not relevant whether Sarah is rational, informed about the problem, motivated to 
answer the question, or struggling with her inability to answer the question; her evidential 
context is such that none of the possible doxastic responses is permissible to revise her 
currently incoherent (and thus irrational) doxastic state. We can apply this definition of 
epistemic dilemma to a particular agent who is in that situation as follows: 
 
Being in an epistemic dilemma 
If an agent A is in an epistemically dilemmic situation, then A is unable to respond 
rationally to the question whether p on the basis of her evidence. 
 
Again, to be in this situation, an agent does not have to be aware that the norms fail to provide 
an epistemically rational recommendation. There is no need for an agent to be trapped in a 
situation to be in that situation. The conditional can be true for epistemic agents who have no 
idea that the epistemic principles fail to recommend an epistemically rational response in their 
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current evidential context in the way ED describes. A’s inability to respond rationally is 
independent of whether or not A knows that this is so. Thus, to address the intuition of 
struggle and being trapped in a dilemma, we need another notion that is about the particular 
agent’s mental state. 
 
4.2  Epistemic Conflict 
I suggest that an agent who is trapped in a problematic epistemic situation, for example in a 
situation of epistemic dilemma, is in a mental state of epistemic conflict. I will define the 
mental state of an epistemically conflicted agent through the help of two necessary conditions 
that are jointly sufficient: 
 
(EC) Epistemic conflict 
An agent A is in the mental state of epistemic conflict with regard to the question 
whether a proposition p is true given her current evidential context if and only if  
(i) A is strongly motivated to answer the question whether p is true, 
(ii) A finds herself unable to answer the question whether p is true on the basis of 
her current evidential context, and 
(iii) A does not expect her current evidential situation to improve. 
 
Conditions (i) and (ii) constitute the agent’s struggle: A is strongly motivated to answer a 
question but finds herself unable to do so. This is a common situation, for sure, and usually a 
reason to engage in further inquiry. Thus, a conflict only arises if further (decisive) evidence 
is not expected by A, for example because A believes that the full body of evidence has been 
assessed already or because time is running out. This is what condition (iii) is adding.10  
Note that epistemic conflicts and epistemic dilemmas do not necessarily apply to the 
same cases. As I indicated above, the fact that an agent is in a situation of epistemic dilemma 
in the sense of ED does not necessarily lead to that agent being epistemically conflicted in the 
sense of EC. Furthermore, an agent who is in the mental state of epistemic conflict is not 
necessarily in a situation of epistemic dilemma. Among other things, this is so because agents 
can misapprehend their evidential situation in two different ways: (a) they do not understand 
that they are in a dilemmic situation and wrongly take themselves able to answer the question; 
(b) they do not understand that they are not in a dilemmic situation and wrongly find 
themselves unable to answer the question. Likewise, agents can also be mistaken in their 
 
10 Thanks to Igor Douven for making me clarify this point. 
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expectations regarding the prospect of future evidence as addressed in condition (iii). So, how 
are the two concepts of epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict connected? The relation 
between epistemic conflict and epistemic dilemma can be described with the help of the 
concept of an ideal agent.  
 
 
Relationship of EC and ED 
An ideal epistemic agent S is in the mental state of epistemic conflict with respect to 
the truth of a proposition p, given a certain body of evidence E only if S is in a 
situation of epistemic dilemma regarding the truth of p given E.  
 
Since the failure of an ideal epistemic agent to answer the question whether p cannot be 
explained by a failure of the ideal agent’s cognitive capacities, it will be the epistemic 
principles that have failed to recommend a rational doxastic response given the evidence at 
hand. An ideal agent S does not find itself unable to answer a question in an evidential 
context if this question can, in principle, be rationally answered in this evidential context. If 
we stipulate that ideal agents have a strong intellectual motivation to settle any question they 
are confronted with, the connection between epistemic dilemmas and epistemic conflicts can 
be established in the other direction as well: in this case, it would be true that S is in the 
mental state of epistemic conflict if and only if S is in a situation of epistemic dilemma. 
In REV-TEST, nonideal but sufficiently rational Sarah is epistemically conflicted 
regarding the question of how to revise her set of answers in light of the report that one 
answer is incorrect. She is conflicted because she is in an epistemic dilemma, understands her 
evidential situation, and is strongly motivated to answer the question. Sarah’s case not only 
describes an epistemically dilemmic situation, in which all possible doxastic responses are 
rationally impermissible, but also illustrates what it is like to be trapped in this dilemma: 
Sarah finds herself unable to answer a question that she is strongly motivated to answer in a 
situation where she does not expect further evidence to decide the issue. Her experienced 
struggle manifests in the mental state of epistemic conflict. 
The proposed distinction between epistemic dilemmas and epistemic conflicts can 
explain why intuitions diverge regarding the transparency of epistemic dilemmas, as I 
described in Section 3.1. On the one hand, the notion of an epistemic dilemma, in the sense of 
ED, describes Sarah’s normative situation independently of her motivation, insight and 
cognitive capacity; on the other hand, the notion of epistemic conflict, in the sense of EC, 
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captures the struggle of which she is painfully aware. The suggested distinction of EC and ED 
can do justice to both intuitions. 
What about the third doxastic stance? How could the distinction between EC and ED 
help here? To appreciate the relevance of this distinction to the role of the neutral stance 
regarding epistemic dilemmas, it is crucial to see that the mental state of epistemic conflict is 
not only reserved for agents such as Sarah who actually are in a situation of epistemic 
dilemma. Epistemic conflict is a broader notion and also covers agents who find themselves 
unable to settle doxastically for some other reason. Most importantly, EC also covers cases in 
which agents are not yet ready to adopt a neutral stance, even though the epistemic principles 
recommend or allow for doing so. I want to argue that, in some situations, it is cognitively and 
psychologically demanding for agents to take the rationally recommended or permissible 
neutral stance, especially if they have to do so against their strong motivation to answer the 
question. In some cases, the adoption of a neutral stance is psychologically not immediately 
available, even if it is normatively required or at least permitted. In contrast to ideal agents, 
nonideal agents may struggle with situations in which they are strongly motivated to answer a 
question, whereas the epistemic principles recommend neutrality. By contrast, in some cases, 
suspension is psychologically available even though it is normatively prohibited like in 
Sarah’s case. Suspension, so I want to suggest, can thus be a way out of a conflict that is 
generated by a genuine dilemma. When agents are epistemically conflicted about a question 
and then suspend with regard to it, they deal with their epistemic conflict without resolving 
the normative situation that constitutes the dilemma. In the following, I will compare Sarah 
and Carl, who both deal with their epistemic conflict by suspending.  
 
4.3  Dealing with Epistemic Conflict 
In principle, there are two ways of resolving an epistemic conflict regarding the truth of a 
proposition p: first, A may believe or disbelieve p. Trivially, by having answered the question 
whether p, A will not be motivated anymore to answer it. Moreover, by having answered the 
question, it is not true anymore that A finds herself unable to answer it: condition (ii) is no 
longer met. Hence, the conflict disappears. Yet, unless the agent is able to exercise some sort 
of direct doxastic control to believe against the evidence, this is not really a promising method 
for resolving a conflict, especially when it is a conflict that is generated by a genuine 
epistemic dilemma. 
Second, A can resolve her conflict by giving up her aim to answer the question: 
condition (i) is no longer met. Psychologically, this can be done in different ways: A may 
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distract herself in ways that result in cognitive overload, confusion, or similar states. 
Sometimes this will work, and A will forget or at least temporarily not think about the 
question. In such cases, A is still unable to answer the question, but she does not struggle with 
her inability anymore (as long as the distraction works, in any case). Another more interesting 
way to give up one’s aim of answering the question is by taking a neutral stance and settle 
one’s indecision.11 By suspending, so I want to suggest, the question whether p is being 
closed without having answered it.12 Again, A will still be unable to answer the question 
whether p, but, due to overcoming her motivation to answer it, A does not struggle with her 
inability anymore, but rather accepts that she is unable to answer the question. Yet, coming to 
terms with one’s own inability and setting aside one’s strong motivation to answer a question 
is cognitively effortful and can take some time. 
In the following, I want to compare Sarah and Carl, who are both in a state of 
epistemic conflict, and deal with this conflict by suspending. Consider Carl’s situation: 
 
COV-TEST  Carl works at a hospital and recently developed symptoms that could 
indicate an infection with COVID-19. The hospital and all the labs around are short of 
test-kits and are forced to stop testing medical staff until new material arrives in a 
fortnight. As it happens, Carl took the very last test available. To make things worse, 
his test was contaminated or lost such that he will never learn the result. 
 
Clearly, Carl cannot answer the question whether he is infected or not, but he is strongly 
motivated to answer it. He needs to know soon to make important practical arrangements such 
as going back to work or isolating at home. Neither can he afford to spread the infection 
among his patients and colleagues, nor can he afford staying home with a simple cold when 
he is needed so badly. The epistemic norms clearly suggest taking a neutral stance on the 
question whether he is infected because there is insufficient evidence. An ideal agent 
(although unable to catch COVID-19) would do just this and act on the assumption that an 
infection cannot be ruled out. However, Carl is not an ideal agent and struggles with his 
inability to answer the question. He goes back and forth and tries to find some clues he might 
be missing that could answer the question and ease his mind. Only after some cognitive effort, 
Carl is psychologically ready to do the prudent thing: setting aside the nagging question and 
 
11 In ‘Agnosticism as settled indecision’ (Wagner forthcoming), I explain in detail what settling one’s indecision 
is about. I argue that epistemic subjects commit to their de facto state of indecision by evaluating it as 
appropriate such that inquiry is closed. This account is open for suspending for pragmatic reasons as is needed in 
Sarah’s case. 
12 There is an interesting discussion about different kinds of suspension some of which are inquiry-closing 
attitudes whereas others are inquiry-starting. See, for example, Staffel (2019). In Wagner (forthcoming), I 
explain why only inquiry-ending suspension can lead to the settled state of agnosticism. 
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accept his own indecision. He then can take precautions and isolate on the basis of not being 
able to rule out an infection and the risks that come with it. Carl gives up his aim to answer 
the question (condition (i)) and thereby deals with his epistemic conflict. By suspending, Carl 
closes the question (at least for now) without answering it. 
In contrast to Carl, Sarah is epistemically conflicted because she is caught in an 
epistemic dilemma. She knows that, given her evidential context, she is unable to answer the 
question that she is strongly motivated to answer: how to revise her set of answers in light of 
the report? Unlike Carl, Sarah is epistemically required not to suspend and not to have no 
attitudes regarding the correctness of her answers. However, as I said in Section 3.2, 
suspending with respect to each individual answer’s correctness while disbelieving the 
conjunction seems somehow better than all the other options. This thought may be explained 
if we think of suspension as a good way to deal with epistemic conflict even though it is not a 
way to resolve an epistemic dilemma. It is still epistemically irrational to be neutral regarding 
the correctness of any single answer because there is good statistical evidence for each answer 
that it is true. However, it seems to be the best thing that Sarah can do to deal with her 
epistemic conflict because her struggle keeps her from resubmitting the set of answers as it 
was. By giving up her aim to get every question right, I want to claim, Sarah can focus on 
practical considerations such as maximizing utility: she can calculate the odds to maximize 
her score without being bothered by her aim of getting it right in every case. This is not to say 
that suspending is required to engage in such calculations; however, giving up the aim of 
getting it right 100% makes things easier for Sarah, such that she can resubmit the original set 
of answers despite knowing that one answer is false. It is thus psychologically plausible that it 
takes some effort to overcome this struggle. After having suspended (and thereby given up on 
her aim to score 100), Sarah remains in a situation of dilemma, but she is no longer caught in 
it.  
Sarah and Carl are both in the mental state of epistemic conflict. Although Sarah’s 
conflict is the consequence of her being caught in an epistemic dilemma, Carl ended up being 
epistemically conflicted due his own incapacity to follow the rational recommendation to 
suspend (or not form an attitude at least). Yet, for both agents, their respective motivation to 
answer the question hinders them from making practical decisions because these depend on 
their respective doxastic verdict. Carl has to decide whether to stay home or go to work, 
depending on his doxastic stance regarding his infection with COVID-19, and Sarah has to 
submit her answers with or without a revision, depending on her doxastic stance regarding 
each individual answer’s correctness. In the end, Sarah and Carl deal with their epistemic 
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conflict in the same way: by suspending. They both give up their aim to answer the question 
and thereby regain their ability to act regarding the practical problem. In suspending, Carl 
does the rationally permissible thing, epistemically as well as pragmatically speaking, 
whereas Sarah, by suspending, is not epistemically rational, but perhaps pragmatically 
rational.  
This may explain the intuition that suspending is in some sense “better” than all the 
other options. Suspending is the best option in light of the practical problem that is a 
consequence of Sarah being caught in the epistemic dilemma. By dealing with her epistemic 
conflict, Sarah is in a better position to handle her practical problem; however, suspending is 
not a means to resolve the normative situation, that is, the epistemic dilemma itself. Instead of 
resolving an epistemic dilemma by suspending, Sarah merely frees herself from the 
dilemma’s grip and stops being caught in it. While she cannot change the dilemmic normative 
situation, she can influence her state of mind with respect to this situation. 
It is interesting to see that dealing with epistemic conflict in this way is not an option 
for ideal agents if the conflict is generated by a genuine dilemma; since this is the only way an 
ideal agent can be epistemically conflicted in the first place, ideal agents are never able to 
deal with their conflicts. Human irrationality seems to prove useful in situations in which 






I would like to thank Igor Douven, Thomas Müller, Daniela Schuster and Alexandra Zinke, as 
well as audiences in Konstanz and Tübingen for their feedback on earlier versions of this 
paper that helped improving it substantially. My special thanks go to the editors of this 
volume for inviting me to contribute to this volume. I want to thank Scott Stapleford and 
Kevin McCain for providing me with insightful comments and helpful questions about my 












Bergman, Michael (2005). Defeaters and higher-level requirements. The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 55(220), 419–436. 
Brouwer, T. N. P. A. (2014). A paradox of rejection. Synthese, 191(18), 4, 451–4,464. 
Christensen, D. (2010). Higher order evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,  
81(1), 185–215. 
Conee, E. (1994). Against an epistemic dilemma. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72(4), 
475–481. 
Foley, R. (1991). Evidence and reasons for belief. Analysis, 51(2), 98–102. 
Friedman, J. (2013). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 162(2), 165–181. 
Friedman, J. (2017). Why suspend judging? Noûs, 51(2), 302–326. 
Kvanvig, J. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2014). Higher order evidence and the limits of defeat. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 314–345. 
Leonard, N. (2020). Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy. Philosophical Studies, 
177(3), 573–596. 
Littlejohn, C. (forthcoming). Dividing away doxastic dilemmas. In Nick Hughes (Ed.), 
Epistemic dilemmas (pp. ##). Oxford University Press. 
Odegard, D. (1993). Resolving epistemic dilemmas. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
71(2), 161–168. 
Priest, G. (2002). Rational dilemmas. Analysis 62(1), 11–16. 
Rosenkranz, S. (2007). Agnosticism as a third stance. Mind, 116(461), 55–104. 
Staffel, J. (2019). Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes. Philosophical 
Issues , 29(1), 281–294. 
Turri, J. (2012). A puzzle about withholding. Philosophical Quarterly, 62(247), 355–364. 
Wagner, V. (forthcoming). Agnosticism as settled indecision. Philosophical Studies. 
 
